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INTRODUCTION
In the past decade, the emergence of blockchain technology and
cryptocurrency has completely disrupted traditional capital markets,
becoming a hot topic among regulators1, legislators2, financial
professionals3, and even celebrities.4 Straying away from the conventional
means of fundraising, digital asset transactions enable developers to raise
capital online to fund a digital project, platform, or software through the
distribution of tokens. Taking the place of initial public offerings (“IPOs”),
emerging technology companies have opted out of pitching their ideas to
venture capitalists and have increasingly looked to initial coin offerings
(“ICOs”) to finance the development of their networks. In turn, ICOs have
come under siege by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”)
because these transactions often involve the distribution of security tokens.
These tokens entitle their holders to certain rights and may thus qualify as
“securities.” Once these tokens are distributed, they may be resold on a
secondary market to investors through a virtual currency exchange or an
online platform. And since crypto markets are largely unregulated, many
investors are scammed and defrauded in the process. Now, the SEC
actively monitors digital asset transactions and has begun its crackdown
on ICOs.
1

Jay Clayton, Statement on Cryptocurrencies and Initial Coin Offerings, U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statementclayton-2017- 12-11.
2
See Kia Kokalitcheva, Congress Holds First Hearing on Initial Coin Offerings, AXIOS
(Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.axios.com/crypto-ico-congress-1521059028-8807c85222de-461a-8c9e- 8a8a9f85d452.html.
3
See Beyond the Hype: Blockchain Technology, ADVISOR PERSPECTIVES (Mar. 28, 2019),
https://www.advisorperspectives.com/podcasts/2019/03/28/beyond-the-hype-blockchaintechnology.
4
Ana Alexandre, US SEC Charges Floyd Mayweather Jr and DJ Khaled for Unlawfully
Promoting ICO, COINTELEGRAPH (Nov. 29, 2018), https://cointelegraph.com/news/us-seccharges-floyd-mayweather-jr-and-dj-khaled-for-unlawfully-promoting-ico.
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To combat the slew of enforcement actions against ICO-conducting
companies, developers are searching for a new way to comply with
demanding federal securities laws. Thus, airdrops have entered the scene.
These “free” token distributions are an imaginative attempt to further
evade the securities regulations. But “free” does not mean free from
regulatory compliance. Airdrops may qualify as securities offerings, even
though the tokens are touted as “free,” bearing strong similarity to “freestock” offerings and other instances of “gifted” securities. Furthermore,
regulators have addressed digital asset trading platforms, broker-dealers,
and other cryptocurrency transactions to deter issuers from conducting
offerings without meeting the requirements set in place by the existing
regulatory framework. Labeling a securities offering as “free” does not
exclude it from the purview of the securities laws—even if it makes
assessing the transaction more difficult.
Although the “crypto craze” has slowed, billions of dollars are still
being raised through digital asset transactions, leaving countless investors
without any protection. Developers continue to craft new names and
methods of conducting securities offerings to escape compliance. In
response, regulators have imposed greater regulatory scrutiny, leaving
little wiggle room for entrepreneurs and new innovations. Balancing the
governments interests in protecting investors, fostering innovation and
creating an efficient market remains challenging, and ultimately the
existing framework might need to be supplemented.
This note aims to clarify and analyze the role of airdrops and the
current state of the crypto market surrounding these transactions, with the
goal of educating the legal community on concepts involving these
security token offerings. Part I of this Note begins by giving a brief
background on cryptocurrency and blockchain technology before
discussing the categorization of coins and tokens. Next, Part I explains
why developers use ICOs and how they are conducted. Part I concludes
with information about airdrops, including what they are, why developers
use them, and how they work.
Part II will give an overview on the SEC’s developing jurisdiction
over digital assets. Part II also defines the term “security token”, explains
the criteria under the Howey test, and describes the registration
requirements that are pertinent to digital asset transactions. Lastly, Part II
examines the regulatory landscape surrounding ICOs which has led to the
emergence of airdrops.
Part III applies the Howey test to examine airdrops in the context of
the federal securities laws. Part III then considers whether these token
distributions need to comply with registration requirements by looking at
prior SEC cases where companies “gifted” stocks. This Part will also
explore how airdrops emulate “free stock” offerings that were halted by
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the SEC, presenting four seminal cases that are analogous to “free” token
offerings. Afterward, this Part describes the first cease and desist order that
appears to address airdrops. Part III also clarifies regulators’ positions
based on their recent actions as well as past cases and discusses what might
be in store for airdrops and the volatile crypto market. Part III concludes
by proposing a potential alternative to a more stringent regulatory regime.
This Note concludes that airdrops might be “free,” but they are not
free from regulatory compliance. Regulators will continue to protect
investors, even at the cost of inhibiting innovation. However, an
alternative to strict regulation might afford better protection to investors.

II. UNDERSTANDING AIRDROPS
A. Brief Background on Cryptocurrency
To fully understand airdrops, it is important to first understand
cryptocurrency, tokens and ICOs. A cryptocurrency is a digital currency
which uses encryption algorithms and cryptographic techniques to
regulate the generation of units of currency and verify the transfer of funds,
operating independently from a central bank.5 It functions as a virtual
medium, but rather than holding on to a tangible piece of paper,
cryptocurrency holders can exchange these virtual assets without having
to rely on a financial institution to process each transaction.6 These
transactions are processed and completed via a peer-to-peer network
through the use of blockchain technology and code.7
Blockchain serves as the foundation for cryptocurrencies,8 and most
notably bitcoin.9 Originating in 2009, blockchain technology was first
implemented by an anonymous author going by the pseudonym Satoshi
Nakamoto.10 Blockchain is:
5

Ameer Rosic, What is Cryptocurrency? [Everything You Need To Know!],
BLOCKGEEKS (updated Sept. 13, 2018), https://blockgeeks.com/guides/what-iscryptocurrency/.
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
See Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-PeerElectronic Cash System, BITCOIN (2008),
https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf.
9
BITCOIN, https://bitcoin.org/en/faq#general (last visited Feb. 8, 2020) (“Bitcoin is a
consensus network that enables a new payment system and a completely digital money. It
is the first decentralized peer-to-peer payment network that is powered by its users with no
central authority or middlemen. From a user perspective, Bitcoin is pretty much like cash
for the Internet.”).
10
Bernard Marr, A Short History of Bitcoin and Crypto Currency Everyone Should Read,
FORBES (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2017/12/06/a-shorthistory-of-bitcoin-and-crypto-currency-everyone-should-read/#12f6a32d3f27.
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“[a] tamper-evident, shared digital ledger that records
transactions in a public or private peer-to-peer network.
Distributed to all member nodes in the network, the ledger
permanently records, in a sequential chain of
cryptographic hash-linked blocks, the history of asset
exchanges that take place between the peers in the
network. All the confirmed and validated transaction
blocks are linked and chained from the beginning of the
chain to the most current block, hence the
name blockchain. The blockchain thus acts as a single
source of truth, and members in a blockchain network can
view only those transactions that are relevant to them.”11
Blockchain therefore enables secure peer-to-peer transactions to take
place without the use of a third-party intermediary, such as a bank.12

B. Categorization of Crypto: Coins vs. Tokens
Cryptocurrencies that have their own separate, standalone blockchain
are referred to as coins while the term token can refer to any
cryptocurrency that is built on top of an existing blockchain.13 Thus,
tokens require another platform to host them so that they may operate and
exist.14 While coins are used to store value and pay for services much in
the same way you would use physical money, tokens instead represent
digital assets with wider functionality.15
Tokens can represent almost any asset that is fungible and
tradeable16—from commodities to voting rights.17 Since tokens only
require an existing platform, they are much easier to create than coins.18
Moreover, creating your own token is practically effortless thanks to
11

Sloane Brakeville & Bhargav Perepa, Blockchain Basics, INT’L BUS. MACH. CORP.
(IBM) (Mar. 18, 2018), https://developer.ibm.com/tutorials/cl-blockchain-basics-introbluemix-trs/.
12
See Nakamoto, supra note 8.
13
Delton Rhodes, Crypto Coin vs. Token: Understanding the Difference, COINCENTRAL
(Aug. 10, 2018), https://coincentral.com/crypto-coin-vs-token-cryptocurrency/.
14
The Basics: Coin vs. Token. What is the Difference?, CITOWISE (Jan. 22, 2018),
https://blog.citowise.com/the-basics-coin-vs-token-what-is-the-difference-5cd270591538.
15
Token vs Coin—what’s the difference? CHRONO.TECH (Aug. 13, 2017),
https://blog.chronobank.io/token-vs-coin-whats-the-difference-5ef7580d1199.
16
Aziz, Master the Crypto Founder, Coins, Tokens & Altcoins: What’s the Difference?,
MASTERTHECRYPTO, https://masterthecrypto.com/differences-between-cryptocurrencycoins-and-tokens//(last visited Feb. 28, 2019).
17
Ed Moffatt, Blockchain Tokens, Simply Explained, MEDIUM (Jan. 14, 2020)
https://medium.com/@edmoffat/blockchain-tokens-simply-explained-d05d88688b65.
18
See Aziz, supra note 16.
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standard templates and smart contracts, which are self-executing,
programmable computer codes.19 These tokens may be created and
distributed to the public through what is known as an initial coin offering
(“ICO”), though this is an apparent misnomer.20

C. Utility Tokens vs. Security Tokens
The two most prevalent types of tokens issued through ICOs are utility
tokens and security tokens.21 The main difference between the two
categories of tokens is their intended use and functionality.22 Utility tokens
are not issued in the form of an investment, whereas security tokens
resemble traditional securities.23 Utility tokens are user tokens that enable
access to future products or services offered by a company.24
Alternatively, security tokens are digital assets that derive their value from
a tradeable asset and entitle their holders to certain ownership rights of the
company.25 The main difference between the two categories of tokens is
that security tokens have to comply with federal securities laws while
utility tokens do not.26
The SEC has primarily used the Howey test to classify the two types
of tokens.27 However, given the ability of both categories of tokens to earn
profit and appreciate in value, it is difficult to clearly delineate the
difference between the two.28 Due to their similarities, utility token

19

See Aziz, supra note 16.
See Arjun Kharpal, Tokenization: The world of ICOs, CNBC (Jul. 16, 2018),
https://www.law.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Rule-18-Handout1.Secara-1.pdf (last updated Apr. 12, 2019) (“[T]he term ICO is actually a misnomer
because it implies a similarity to an IPO. ICOs, or as we prefer to call them ‘Token
Generation Events’ (TGEs), are fundamentally different than IPOs in that an IPO is
conducted by a mature company with a live product and revenue, while a TGE represents
the birth of a new currency which powers a network.”).
21
Katalyse, Io, Security Tokens vs. Utility Tokens— How different are they?,
CRYPTODIGEST (Jul. 27, 2018), https://cryptodigestnews.com/security-tokens-vs-utilitytokens-how-different-are-they-8a439c73e616.
22
Id.
23
Tamer Sameeh, ICO Basics- the difference between security tokens and utility tokens,
COINTELLIGENCE (Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.cointelligence.com/content/ico-basicssecurity-tokens-vs-utility-tokens/ (“To sum up security tokens entitle their holders with
ownership rights, whereas utility tokens can be thought of as coupons that grant holders
access to certain products or services.”).
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Complete Guide to Security Tokens: How they Work Explained Simply, THE TOKENIST,
https://thetokenist.io/security-tokens-explained/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2019).
27
Id.
28
Id.
20
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developers prefer to call ICOs involving these categories of tokens “token
generation events.”29

D. What is an ICO?
ICOs have become extremely popular in the last few years as a means
of raising capital for virtual projects. According to the latest statistics, over
$7 billion was raised via ICOs in the U.S. in 2018 alone.30 In fact, the U.S.
takes the lead when it comes to conducting ICOs, evidenced by the graph
below: 31

Despite a sharp increase in the amount of funds raised via ICOs from
the prior year, the number of ICOs appears to be declining in 2019.32 This
significant pullback may be a result of companies choosing to fund their
cryptocurrency projects through means compliant with the securities

29

Sameeh, supra note 23.
Funds Raised in 2018, ICODATA.IO, https://www.icodata.io/stats/2018 (last visited Mar.
1, 2019).
31
ICO Funds and Trends Analysis 2018, INWARA, https://www.inwara.com/report/annualreport2018?utm_source=annualrepecryphub&utm_medium=annualrepecryphub&utm_campaig
n=annualrepecryphub (last visited Mar. 1, 2019).
32
Ajit Tripathi, RIP ICOs: 2019 Will Be the Year of Enterprise Blockchain Tokens,
COINDESK (Jan. 6, 2019), https://www.coindesk.com/r-i-p-icos-2019-will-be-the-year-ofenterprise-blockchain-tokens.
30
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laws.33 Yet despite the slowdown, some companies are still choosing to
use ICOs to raise funds.34 So, what exactly is an ICO?
“An ICO is a fundraising event, effected using distributed
ledger technology, in which a “token” or “coin” is offered
to a participant in return for either cash (fiat currency) or
cryptocurrency, such as Ether or Bitcoin. A token entitles
its holders to various rights, which typically include the
right to use a service to be developed and offered by the
issuer. The proceeds of the token sale are used to fund a
venture or a project undertaken by the ICO sponsors.
Similar to equity securities, however, tokens sold in ICOs
may also confer profit rights, may appreciate in value, and
can be traded. ICO tokens do not represent an ownership
interest in a venture.”35
In 2013 the first ever ICO took place, opening the door to this
alternative method of funding for emerging companies.36 ICOs also bear
similarities to traditional IPOs because investors can earn a return on their
digital asset instrument—usually by selling their tokens on the secondary
market once value is created and the digital project takes off.37
The ICO process typically begins when a development team
announces an ICO through an online channel, such as a cryptocurrency
website or forum.38 This announcement will likely include access to the
33

Elizabeth Gail, Muliti-Billion Dollar ICO Market Down to A Few Hundred Million,
COINCENTRAL (Sep. 13, 2018), https://coincentral.com/multibillion-dollar-ico-marketdown/.
34
The ICO is Dead…Or Is It?, INVEST IN BLOCKCHAIN (Dec. 12, 2018),
https://www.investinblockchain.com/ico-is-dead/.
35
David Felsenthal et al., SEC Brings Enforcement Against Initial Coin Offering,
CLIFFORD
CHANCE
LLP
(Oct.
2017),
https://www.cliffordchance.com/content/dam/cliffordchance/briefings/2017/10/secbrings-first-enforcement-action-against-initial-coin-offering.pdf.
36
Howard Marks, The ICO is Dead. Long Live the ICO 2.0., HACKERNOON (Feb. 21, 2018)
https://hackernoon.com/the-ico-is-dead-long-live-the-ico-2-0-7bb269987513 (“It turns out
the first ever ICO was Mastercoin (now called Omni), which raised 5,000 Bitcoin at a total
value of $500,000 in 2013. Mastercoin organized a foundation called the Mastercoin
Foundation to receive the Bitcoin and manage the project.”).
37
William Hinman, Dir., SEC Div. of Corp. Fin., Remarks at the Yahoo Finance All
Markets Summit: Crypto Digital Asset Transactions: When Howey Met Gary (Plastic),
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (June 14, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speechhinman-061418#_ftn3.
38
Rocky Mui, Initial Coin Offerings, Asking the Right Regulatory Questions, CLIFFORD
CHANCE
LLP
(May
2018),
https://www.cliffordchance.com/content/dam/cliffordchance/briefings/2018/05/initialcoin-offerings-asking-the-right-regulatory-questions.pdf.
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project’s website, which will feature “white paper,” a crucial instrument
of the ICO process.39 The white paper will describe the project, key terms
of the ICO, including subscription details, a timeline, the roadmap for the
project, how the funds will be used and why the project is useful40—
essentially all the information a prospective investor would need in
deciding on whether they should invest in the project.41 The white paper
should provide key information to potential investors in a friendly
manner42 because, oftentimes, ICOs are held before the project is in a
profit-generating state, meaning developers must focus on building
confidence in their project so that they can receive necessary funding.43
The development team also creates a webpage and a group chat to keep
interested investors in the loop.44 These webpages and group chats provide
updates about development and important, upcoming dates.45
The development team will also provide a pre-sale, which is accessible
for certain people who register for the “white list”, prior to launching the
ICO.46 The pre-sale is held for a specified period of time, allowing those
with access to exchange their coins47 for the project’s new tokens at a
lower price.48 Until the project is actually released, however, the tokens
will have no use, and their value on secondary markets will be purely
speculative.49 Furthermore, if the project does not reach its funding goal,
the funds contributed are returned and the token ceases to exist.50
Following the pre-sale, an investor may participate in a public sale by
transferring funds to the issuer in exchange for new tokens during the

39

How to Launch an ICO, A Detailed Guide, COINTELEGRAPH,
https://cointelegraph.com/ico-101/how-to-launch-an-ico-a-detailed-guide#5-write-awhite-paper (last visited Mar. 2, 2019).
40
Waves Lab, How to write the white paper for an ICO project, MEDIUM (Apr. 27, 2018),
https://medium.com/waves-lab/how-to-write-the-white-paper-for-an-ico-project2de3098c3407.
41
Id.
42
COINTELEGRAPH, supra note 39.
43
How to Develop a White Paper for ICO: Do’s and Don’ts, COINTELEGRAPH (Aug. 21,
2017),
https://cointelegraph.com/news/how-to-develop-white-paper-for-ico-dos-anddonts.
44
COINTELEGRAPH, supra note 39.
45
Id.
46
Phil Glazer, Understanding Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs), HACKERNOON (Jan. 28, 2018),
https://hackernoon.com/evaluating-an-initial-coin-offering-ico-f9c24be0698b.
47
Id. (“When the pre-sale or public sale period happens people will contribute funds by
sending Bitcoin (BTC) or Ethereum (ETH) to a designated wallet address.”).
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.

320

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:311

subscription process.51 Unlike the pre-sale, the public sale is usually open
longer and open to all investors.52
Despite the risk that projects may come up short, many ICOs do
receive necessary funding to launch their platform.53 For example, in June
2017 the EOS software developers54 raised over $4.1 billion during the
project’s ICO alone.55 However, even though a project may receive
necessary funding through an ICO, there is no guarantee that the project
will be successful following its launch.56 In fact, a study suggests that more
than half of ICO projects fail within four months of their token sales.57
Yet despite the high risk of failure, there are alluring “advantages” of
ICOs that may outweigh their costs. ICOs enable entrepreneurs to raise
funds rather quickly and easily.58 Unlike conventional methods of
fundraising, ICOs are largely unregulated.59 Ideally, ICOs give
entrepreneur-developers an idea of the price customers will pay for their
product or service.60 ICOs also allow for community building without
geographic barriers, widespread exposure, and most importantly, low-cost
fund raising.61

51

Mui, supra note 38.
Glazer, supra note 46.
53
See Jeffrey Tucker, Despite What You Hear, The ICO is Not Over, FORBES (Aug. 18,
2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffreytucker/2018/08/18/despite-what-you-hear-theico-is-not-rip/#84b0dc031921.
54
EOS, ICOBENCH, https://icobench.com/ico/eos (last visited Mar. 2, 2019) (“EOS.IO is
software that introduces a blockchain architecture designed to enable vertical and
horizontal scaling of decentralized applications (the ‘EOS.IO Software’). This is achieved
through an operating system-like construct upon which applications can be built. The
software provides accounts, authentication, databases, asynchronous communication and
the scheduling of applications across multiple CPU cores and/or clusters. The resulting
technology is a blockchain architecture that has the potential to scale to millions of
transactions per second, eliminates user fees and allows for quick and easy deployment of
decentralized applications.”).
55
Id.
56
See Daniel Palmer, More Than Half of ICOs Fail Within 4 Months, Study Suggests,
COINDESK (Jul. 10, 2018), https://www.coindesk.com/over-half-of-icos-fail-within-4months-suggests-us-study.
57
Id.
58
Glazer, supra note 46.
59
Theodore Schleifer, Silicon Valley is obsessed with ICOs- here’s why, RECODE (Sept. 19,
2017 1:06 pm EDT), https://www.recode.net/2017/9/19/16243110/initial-coin-offeringico-explained-what-is-money-bitcoin-digital-currency.
60
Betsey Vereckey, The pros and cons of ICOs for entrepreneurs, MIT SLOAN SCHOOL OF
MANAGEMENT (Apr. 12, 2018), https://mitsloan.mit.edu/ideas-made-to-matter/pros-andcons-icos-entrepreneurs.
61
See id.; see also Tucker, supra note 53.
52
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However, regulators’ crackdown has been the greatest pitfall of
conducting an ICO.62 Thus, some developers have replaced ICOs with
airdrops.63

E. Demystifying the Definition of an Airdrop: What is it and How
Does it Work?
In laymen’s terms an airdrop is the practice through which developers
of a new cryptocurrency-based project distribute “free” tokens to
community members (also known as “users”).64 Why are developers
giving away “free” tokens? An airdrop may be used as a marketing tool
and a distribution mechanism.65 With over 1,900 cryptocurrencies on the
market today, it is vital for developers to effectively promote their new
projects.66 Rising competition in an already saturated marketplace has led
to new techniques for raising awareness. Rather than using ICO
advertising—which is now banned by many online platforms (including
Facebook)67—crypto entrepreneurs are using airdrops as a marketing
alternative.68
When done in a legitimate fashion, airdropping can be an effective
marketing ploy to lift a new project off the ground.69 Not only are airdrops
used for “obscure” tokens, but they are also used for popular tokens as
well. In May 2018, Tron Foundation completed an airdrop of $1.7 million
worth of its TRX tokens to community members owning Ethereum.70 Tron
is far from obscure, and with a market cap of over $3.8 billion it is
considered to be one of the most valuable “cryptocurrencies” on the
market.71

62

See Vereckey, supra note 60.
See Kai Sedgwick, Six Alternatives to an Initial Coin Offering, BITCOIN.COM (June 18,
2018), https://news.bitcoin.com/six-alternatives-to-an-initial-coin-offering/.
64
See Jake Frankenfield, Cryptocurrency Airdrop, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/airdrop-cryptocurrency.asp (last updated Nov. 12,
2019).
65
Ian Lee, What is a Cryptocurrency Airdrop and How Does it Differ from an ICO?,
COINGECKO (June 11, 2018), https://www.coingecko.com/buzz/what-is-a-cryptocurrencyairdrop-and-howdoes-it-differ-from-an-ico?locale=en.
66
Id.
67
Asha Barbaschow, Facebook holds ICO ban but allows ‘approved’ cryptocurrency ads,
ZDNET (June 27, 2018) https://www.zdnet.com/article/facebook-holds-ico-ban-butallows-approved-cryptocurrency-ads/.
68
Lee, supra note 65.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id.
63
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Obscure projects also might want to bolster community recognition by
airdropping their tokens in an attempt to create “buzz.”72 Thus, developers
rely on these distributions as well as users to create brand awareness and
“buzz.”73
While these airdropped tokens are touted as “free,” they ultimately
come at a price for recipients.74 Developers anticipate that the airdrop
recipient will perform actions that are beneficial to the project’s
development,75 i.e., performing marketing services in exchange for
receiving tokens.76 Despite the notion of being “free”77, airdrops often
demand the performance of small tasks, including posting on social media
forums, writing a blog post, or even connecting with a particular member
of the blockchain project.78 In effect, this serves as a “lead generation and
referral campaign,”79 shifting the promotional responsibility to the
community members.80 These free token offerings are also used as a way
to reward early supporters who have already invested, giving them
additional tokens.81 Companies hope that these tactics will prompt early
investors to hold on to their tokens. 82
These massive token drops also function as a distribution device. 83
Airdrops can occur in tandem with an ICO, or after an ICO takes place,
serving as a means to disseminate tokens to the community at large.84 Once
funds are raised for the project via token sales (ICO), developers may use
a free token give away as a way to jump start long-term network growth.85

72

See id.
See generally id.
74
Rebecca G. DiStefano & Pallav Raghuvanshi, Securities and Tax Law Effects of Token
Airdrops,
GREENBERG
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COINDESK (Nov. 12, 2018), https://www.coindesk.com/crypto-token-airdrops-are-amarketing-ploy-and-thats-ok.
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Sudhir Khatwani, Airdrops in Cryptocurrenices, COINSUTRA (last updated Aug. 11,
2019), https://coinsutra.com/what-is-airdrop/.
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Lee, supra note 65.
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DiStefano & Raghuvanshi, supra note 75.
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See Shaurya Malwa, All you need to know about Crypto Airdrops. AKA Free Money,
HACKERNOON (Mar. 1, 2018), https://hackernoon.com/all-you-need-to-know-aboutcrypto-airdrops-aka-free-money-243e60b22493; see also Esteban Casatano, Why ICOs
and
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(Apr.
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Of course, the end goal is mass adoption of the token.86 By rewarding users
with these “freebies,” project developers build a community for their
token.87 Even though the users are receiving relatively small amounts of
tokens, the audience is usually sizeable.88 This effectively creates a
community of token holders and users.89
This so-called “community creation” leads to awareness and may also
lead to a greater demand for the token.90 This is because, inevitably, some
of the users who receive the “free” tokens may do research and decide to
acquire more of the tokens.91 Users also tend to assign a greater value to a
token they are holding than one they encounter on the open market.92 Thus,
this “endowment effect”93 also leads to users building up the network and
the community surrounding the token.94 On the other hand, an advantage
for users receiving “free” tokens is that they are able to “‘test, trade, and
transact unfamiliar crypto assets without having to mine or invest first.”95
An airdrop can either be announced or unannounced prior to
distribution.96 In the case of an unannounced airdrop, users find
themselves pleasantly surprised upon noticing new tokens in their digital

https://medium.com/@estebancastano/solving-the-token-distribution-problemc5ec3e37550.
86
Evelyn Cheng, Want free cryptocurrency? ‘Airdrops’ is coming, CNBC (Mar. 12, 2018),
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Lee, supra note 65.
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See Kenny Li, WTF is an Airdrop? HACKERNOON (Feb. 27, 2018),
https://hackernoon.com/all-you-need-to-know-about-crypto-airdrops-aka-free-money243e60b22493.
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Lee, supra note 65.
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Id.
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Id.
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Akhilesh
Ganti,
Endowment
Effect,
INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/endowment-effect.asp (last updated Aug. 16, 2019)
(“Studies have shown repeatedly that people will value something that they already own
more than a similar item they do not own.”).
93
Id. (“[A] circumstance in which an individual places a higher value on an object that they
already own than the value they would place on that same object if they did not own it.”).
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Lee, supra note 65.
95
Marie Huillet, Blockchain.com Wallet Adds Stellar, Announces $125 Mln XLM Airdrop
to
‘Drive
Adoption’,
COINTELEGRAPH
(Nov.
6,
2018),
https://cointelegraph.com/news/blockchaincom-wallet-adds-stellar-announces-125-mlnxlm-airdrop-to-drive-adoption.
96
Airdrop List, ICO MARKS, https://icomarks.com/airdrops (last visited Jan. 5, 2019)
(Displaying a list of active airdrops that a user may subscribe to and what requirements are
needed to participate in each airdrop. The list also lets users know when the announced
airdrops end.); Jack Filiba, Airdrop, COINSQUARE (Mar. 27, 2018),
https://news.coinsquare.com/learn-coinsquare/airdrops-digital-currencies/.
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wallets.97 In some instances, the distribution is triggered when users hold
certain cryptocurrencies or a specific number of crypto tokens in their
wallet.98 Developers may decide to distribute tokens after taking a
“snapshot” of a block of particular cryptocurrency, entitling those holding
the currency (as of the date of the snapshot) to “free” tokens.99 In the case
of announced airdrops, users can check websites that list scheduled
airdrops and subscribe to the airdrops of their choice.100
Airdrops are appealing to developers as a low-cost marketing strategy,
though many critics find these “free” distributions to be an utter waste of
time.101 Distributing too many tokens can create a surplus, diluting the
token supply.102 There is also no guarantee that the recipients of the tokens
will hold on to them.103 If enough of the recipients sell the token after
receiving it, then its value will likely diminish.104 A sufficient number of
sales may lead to the token’s demise.
Additionally, developers often set their expectations too high.105 An
increase in the token’s usage does not necessarily occur simply because
users hold onto airdropped tokens.106 Nor does it mean that users view the
tokens as anything other than spam.107 Without sufficient incentives, token

97

Cryptocurrency airdrop | What is a crypto airdrop?, BEST BITCOIN ALTERNATIVE,
https://bestbitcoinalternative.com/resources/cryptocurrency-airdrop/ (last visited Jan. 8,
2019).
98
See Crypto Account Builders, Beginners Guide to Crypto Airdrops: Free Coins
& Tokens, MEDIUM (Oct. 5, 2018) https://medium.com/@johnhinkle_80891/beginnersguide-to-crypto-airdrops-free-coins-tokens-643a7327709b.
99
See Ermos Kyriakides, All You Need to Know About Airdrops, HACKERNOON (July 31,
2018), https://hackernoon.com/all-you-need-to-know-about-airdrops-98b1b5af7941.
100
See AIRDROP ALERT.COM, https://airdropalert.com/about-us (last visited Jan. 24, 2020)
(“AirdropAlert.com launched June 2017 to create awareness to the crypto community
about the existence of airdrops. We believe majority of crypto fanatics are not aware of the
concept of airdrops and how to claim it. We started an informational page where you can
find data on when and where airdrops take place. We started as a team of 3 to collect data
on airdrops and list them. With the rapid growth of airdrops, visitors and subscribers we
quickly expended to a team of 15. Our goal is to provide information about legitimate ways
to collect free cryptocurrency. Due to demand of ICOs we started the concept of Exclusive
Airdrops that are hosted by us. We have hosted, promoted, marketed and distributed
airdrops for over 30 ICOs.”).
101
Nathan Reiff, Cryptocurrency Forks Vs. Airdrops: What’s the Difference?,
INVESTOPEDIA, (July 3, 2018) https://www.investopedia.com/tech/cryptocurrencyforks-vs-airdrops-whats-difference/.
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See Casatano, supra note 86.
105
See id.
106
Id.
107
Id.

2020]

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

325

holders will stray away from using the product and in turn the network will
not grow.108
In fact, each holder is more apt to free ride on the growth of the
network than to promote or use it themselves.109 These speculative users
might even have a negative impact on the network since there are only a
finite number of tokens and they are holding on to them when other users
would use them.110 Thus, opponents to airdrops view the distributions as
“flawed” because the recipients are motivated by the promise of “free”
money with no real incentives to use the product, increase its utility, or
grow the network. 111 However, for some companies the benefits
overshadow the inconveniences of conducting a “free” token giveaway.

III. OVERVIEW OF THE SEC’S DEVELOPING JURISDICTION
OVER DIGITAL ASSETS
Following the Great Crash of 1929, Congress created the SEC to
“protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and
facilitate capital formation.”112 This mission is based on the simple
concept that “all investors, whether large institutions or private
individuals, should have access to certain basic facts about an investment
prior to buying it, and so long as they hold it.”113 To achieve this mission,
the SEC requires full and fair disclosure so that investors may make use
of this information for any transactions where they are buying, selling or
holding a security.114 Only through the flow of timely, comprehensive and
accurate information can people make “sound investment decisions.”115
For an investor to be afforded with protection from the SEC, a security
must be involved.116 Thus, determining the reach of the SEC’s jurisdiction

108

See Alex Munkachy, A Detailed Guide to Avoiding Airdrop and Bounty Scams, COINIQ
(Sept. 9, 2018), https://coiniq.com/airdrop-bounty-scams/.
109
See Casatano, supra note 86.
110
See id.
111
Id.
112
About the SEC: What We Do, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
https://www.sec.gov/Article/whatwedo.html (last modified June 10, 2013).
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
Eva Su, Digital Assets and SEC regulation, CONG. RES. SERV. (Jan. 30, 2020),
https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20200130_R46208_8c73c5838d376d44e3d841ead
7bb65df15744fb3.pdf (“Securities regulation generally applies to all securities, whether
they are digital or traditional. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is the
primary regulator overseeing securities offerings, sales, and investment activities. The
SEC’s mission is to protect investors; maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets; and
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over cryptocurrency transactions is difficult.117 Yet, the Commission is
actively attempting to protect investors from the risks involved in digital
asset transactions, announcing initiatives such as the creation of the Cyber
Unit,118 which is tasked with investigating digital misconduct and fraud to
protect retail investors.119
In light of the recent craze in cryptocurrencies, the SEC has attempted
to clarify its position regarding digital tokens, ICOs, and cryptocurrency
itself. Released in July 2017, the Decentralized Autonomous Organization
(“DAO”) report marked the first instance where the SEC memorialized its
position on the nature of digital tokens.120 Today, digital assets can
function as a medium of exchange, a unit of account, or store value.121
Increasingly, however, these tokens are being used to represent other types
of rights, like the right to participate in earning the developer’s profits.122
Depending on the situation, these other rights may cause the digital assets
to be labeled as securities.123

facilitate capital formation. The existing securities regulatory regime generally aligns with
this mission, and the SEC’s digital asset regulation generally follows the same regime.”).
117
Jay Clayton, Statement on Cryptocurrencies and Initial Coin Offerings, U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N (Dec. 11, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statementclayton-2017- 12-11 (“It has been asserted that cryptocurrencies are not securities and that
the offer and sale of cryptocurrencies are beyond the SEC’s jurisdiction. Whether that
assertion proves correct with respect to any digital asset that is labeled as a cryptocurrency
will depend on the characteristics and use of that particular asset.”).
118
SEC Announces Enforcement Initiatives to Combat Cyber-Based Threats and Protect
Retail Investors, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2017-176 (last visited Mar. 2, 2019).
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Mitchell Moos, SEC’s New Cyber Unit Tasked with Blockchain Securities Fraud,
CRYPTOSLATE (Apr. 23, 2018), https://cryptoslate.com/secs-new-cyber-unit-tasked-withblockchain-securities-fraud/ (“According to Stephanie Avakian, Co-Director of the SEC’s
Enforcement Division: ‘Cyber-related threats and misconduct are among the greatest risks
facing investors and the securities industry. The Cyber Unit will enhance our ability to
detect and investigate cyber threats through increasing expertise in an area of critical
national importance.’”).
120
See Report of Investigation Pursuant to 21(a) of the Sec. & Exch. Act of 1934: The DAO,
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Release
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(July
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2017),
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-81207.pdf
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A. Categorizing Crypto – Different Tokens Means Different
Treatment
Because its jurisdiction is limited to “securities”, the SEC provided its
position on the cryptocurrencies it considers securities and which
cryptocurrencies are not.124 In doing so, the SEC broadly grouped these
digital assets into three categories: currency, utility tokens, and security
tokens.125 SEC Chairman Jay Clayton has further clarified the agency’s
position with regard to the first category: “These are replacements for
sovereign currencies, replace the dollar, the euro, the yen with bitcoin,
[t]hat type of currency is not a security.”126 Since the SEC does not have
jurisdiction over transactions in currencies or commodities the
distinction between the categories is significant.127 In contrast, Clayton
addressed “token[s], or a digital asset[s] used in a fundraising process” as
securities.128 This helps to further distinguish the two tokens since utility
tokens are not created for fundraising or investment purposes.129
Establishing jurisdiction over the two categories of tokens is trickier,
especially after the release of the DAO Report.130 The DAO Report warned
issuers of potential liability associated with issuing security tokens,
thereby prompting issuers to find creative ways to avoid their tokens being
labelled as security tokens.131 For example, crypto-companies issued socalled “utility” tokens to raise funds for development.132 By mislabeling
their tokens, issuers sought to avoid friction with regulators, though this
tactic did not last.133 The SEC addressed this tactic, most notably in the
124

Kate Rooney, SEC’s Clayton needs to see key upgrades in cryptocurrency markets
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a
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ETF,
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(Nov.
27,
2018),
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Munchee Order.134 On December 11, 2017, the SEC issued a cease and
desist order against Munchee Inc. for offering and selling unregistered
security tokens.135 Although the California company labeled its MUN
tokens as utility tokens, the SEC found the tokens were security tokens
pursuant to the Howey test. 136
Chairman Clayton further vocalized the SEC’s stance on issuer’s
mislabeling strategy:
“[m]erely calling a token a “utility” token or structuring it
to provide some utility does not prevent the token from
being a security.137 Tokens and offerings that incorporate
features and marketing efforts that emphasize the
potential for profits based on the entrepreneurial or
managerial efforts of others continue to contain the
hallmarks of a security under U.S. law.”138
The blurred line between utility tokens and security tokens has led to
SEC investigations of cases involving digital tokens on an ad hoc basis,
applying the Howey test to the particular facts and circumstances in each
case.139

B. The Howey Test: Pulling Apart the Prongs
The SEC’s regulation of cryptocurrency has been difficult because the
agency lacks power to create new laws or modify existing ones. Therefore,
the SEC must rely on the Howey test to determine whether certain tokens
and transactions are within its jurisdiction, and whether these items can be
properly classified as securities.140

tokens-and-the-evolution-of-cryptocurrency-5f1bdcde1845 (“The majority of tokens
released in 2017 claimed to be utility tokens to avoid any friction with the SEC but in fact,
they were actually security tokens.”).
134
In re Munchee Inc., Securities Act Release No. 10445 (Dec. 11, 2017),
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2017/33-10445.pdf.
135
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136
Id.
137
Jay Clayton, Statement on Cryptocurrencies and Initial Coin Offerings, U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N (Dec. 11, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statementclayton-2017- 12-11; see also Hinman, supra note 37.
138
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Id.
140
Framework for “Investment Contract” Analysis of Digital Assets, U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N (Apr. 3, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/framework-investment-contractanalysis-digital-assets (“The Securities Act of 1933 defines a ‘security’ in part as ‘an
investment contract,’ the definition of which was set forth by the Supreme Court in the
landmark case SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.”).
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Director of the U.S. SEC’s Division of Corporate Finance, William
Hinman, specifically addressed application of the Howey test to digital
asset transactions in July 2018, marking an important milestone for the
agency.141 A transaction involving a “security” automatically triggers
application of the federal securities laws, permitting the SEC to step in.142
The Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”), and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), have nearly identical definitions143 for the
term “security”, which is broadly defined to furnish investors with as much
protection as possible.144 Whether a token is a security also becomes
crucial for token issuers and people who facilitate the promotion and
issuance of tokens because of liability under the federal securities laws.145
The definition of security denotes a laundry list of instruments deemed
to be securities, including “investment contracts.”146 The Supreme Court
demarcated the boundaries of this vague term through its decision in SEC
v. W.J. Howey Co.147 In Howey, an investment contract was defined as “a
contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person (1) invests his money
(2) in a common enterprise and (3) is led to expect profits (4) solely from
the efforts of the promoter or a third party.”148
In determining whether the underlying transaction meets the Howey
test, emphasis is placed on its economic implications rather than the name
provided by its creator.149 Examining the economic realities of each
141

Id. (Hinman analogized the digital assets, which are essentially computer codes, to
orange groves in Howey: “Just as in the Howey case, tokens and coins are often touted
as assets that have a use in their own right, coupled with a promise that the assets will be
cultivated in a way that will cause them to grow in value, to be sold later at a profit.”).
142
See generally Division of Enforcement and Trading and Markets, Statement on
Potentially Unlawful Online Platforms for Trading Digital Assets, U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/enforcement-tmstatement-potentially-unlawful-online-platforms-trading.
143
See 15. U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (1933) ; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1934); see also
SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 393 (2004) (holding that, while these definitions are not
identical, the U.S. Supreme Court has “treated [them] as essentially identical in meaning”).
144
Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 60-61 (1990) (“Congress painted with a broad
brush. It recognized the virtually limitless scope of human ingenuity, especially in the
creation of ‘countless and variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of the
money of others on the promise of profits,’ and determined that the best way to achieve its
goal of protecting investors was to define the term 'security' in sufficiently broad and
general terms so as to include within that definition the many types of instruments that in
our commercial world fall within the ordinary concept of a security.”).
145
Tang, supra note 121.
146
See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (1934); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (2012).
147
See generally SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
148
Id.; see also BRENT A. OLSON, PUBLICLY TRADED CORPORATIONS HANDBOOK § 4:10
(2019).
149
See United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 853 (1975); see also Reves,
494 U.S. at 61 (“In discharging our duty, we are not bound by legal formalisms, but instead
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transaction aligns with Congress’ purpose in enacting the Federal
securities laws: “to regulate investments, in whatever form they are made
and by whatever name they are called.”150 Emerging as the “catchall
category” for securities that do not fit plainly within the definition of
“security,” the term “investment contract” embodies a flexible standard,
and is capable of adapting to meet various schemes.151
The first prong of the Howey test requires an investment of money,
though this should not be read literally.152 An investment of money does
not need to be money per se. Instead, “the ‘investment’ may take the form
of ‘goods and services,’153 or some other ‘exchange of value’”.154 Both
courts and regulators interpret “money” broadly, reflecting the flexible
nature of the federal securities laws.155
The second prong, commonality, is established where it is shown that
investors have interrelated interests in a common scheme.156 In analyzing
whether a “common enterprise” exists, the courts look to three different
approaches: the horizontal approach, the broad vertical approach and the
narrow vertical approach.157 The horizontal approach focuses on the
relationship among investors in an economic venture, looking to whether
investors “share the risks and benefits of the business enterprise.”158 The
narrow vertical approach assesses commonality with regard to whether the
promoter and investor are both exposed to risk and the profits and losses
of each are interwoven.159 The broad vertical approach is less constrictive
take account of the economics of the transaction under investigation.”); see
also Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) (“[I]n searching for the meaning and
scope of the word ‘security’. . . form should be disregarded for substance and the emphasis
should be on economic reality.”).
150
SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 396 (2004) (“Congress[] inten[ded] to regulate all of
the countless and variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money of
others on the promise of profits.”) (quoting SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299
(1946)).
151
See Howey, 328 U.S. at 301 (“investment contract” is not a defined term, rather “[i]t
embodies a flexible rather than a static principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet
the countless and variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money of
others on the promise of profits.”).
152
Id.
153
See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 560 (1979) (an investment may
take the form of “goods and “services” rather than just “cash”).
154
See Hocking v. Dubois, 885 F.2d 1449, 1471 (9th Cir. 1989) (explaining an exchange
of value satisfies the first prong of the Howey test).
155
See id.
156
See generally Howey, 328 U.S. at 293.
157
Ryan Borneman, Why the Common Enterprise Test Lacks a Common Definition: A Look
Into the Supreme Court's Decision of SEC v. Edwards, 5 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 16 (2005),
https://blj.ucdavis.edu/archives/vol-5-no-2/why-the-common-enterprise-test.html#_ftn25.
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Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. ETS Payphones, Inc., 300 F.3d 1281, 1284 (11th Cir. 2002).
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Borneman, supra note 159.
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because it requires only that the profits and losses of the investor and
promoter be related in some fashion.160 The “pooling”161 of investors’
assets is the integral part of the horizontal approach, making it more
difficult to satisfy because it depends on the coordination of multiple
investors.162
The third prong of the Howey test is crucial and weighs heavily on the
overall investment contract determination.163 This prong is met when
shown that investors are led to believe there is a reasonable expectation of
profits and where they are motivated by financial return, rather than by
consumption of the goods or services received.164 Simply stated, it must
be shown that investors are expecting profits in return for their investment.
Finally, the last prong of the Howey Test requires that expected profits
come “solely from the efforts of others.” “Solely” should not be
interpreted literally,165 but should represent situations where investors
have passive roles in the success or failure of the investment.166 The
instrument is typically considered a security where the promoter or issuer
remains in control over the managerial conduct of the investment and the
investor is unable to participate in decision making.167

160

Payphones, 300 F.3d at 1284 (“Broad vertical commonality . . . only requires a movant
to show that the investors are dependent upon the expertise or efforts of the investment
promoter for their returns . . . .”).
161
Id. at 1283-84 (“Most circuits that have considered the issue find it satisfied where a
movant shows 'horizontal commonality,' that is the 'pooling' of investors' funds as a result
of which the individual investors share all the risks and benefits of the business
enterprise.”).
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Jeffrey A. Bekiares, Esq., What is the Howey Test? How to Tell if a Coin Passes the Test,
SMART UP LEGAL (July 20, 2018), https://www.smartuplegal.com/learn-center/what-isthe-howey-test- how-to-tell-if-a-coin-passes-the-test/.
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Hinman, supra note 37 (“What are some of the factors to consider in assessing whether
a digital asset is offered as an investment contract and is thus a security? Primarily, consider
whether a third party – be it a person, entity or coordinated group of actors – drives the
expectation of a return. That question will always depend on the particular facts and
circumstances[.]”).
164
See United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 858 (1975) (describing a
security transaction as “an investment where one parts with his money in the hope of
receiving profits from the efforts of others, and not where he purchases a commodity for
personal consumption or living quarters for personal use.”).
165
Hirsch v. Dupont, 396 F. Supp. 1214, 1218-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff’d, 553 F.2d 750 (2d
Cir. 1977).
166
A Securities Law Framework for Blockchain Tokens, COINBASE (last updated Dec. 7,
2016), https://www.coinbase.com/legal/securities-law-framework.pdf.
167
See Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689, 692 (3d Cir. 1973) (holding that “an
investment contract can exist where the investor is required to perform some duties, as long
as they are nominal or limited and would have little direct effect upon receipt by the
participants of the benefits promised by the promoters.”).
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C. Registration Requirements
1. Securities Act of 1933
Once a token is labeled a security it must be registered unless it
otherwise qualifies under an exemption.168 Enacted in 1933, the Securities
Act regulates the offer and sale of securities within the United States.169
Specifically, Section 5(a)and 5(c) of the act prohibit the offer and sale of
unregistered securities unless an exemption is available that negates the
registration requirement.170 Section 5 is a mechanism for regulating the
timeline and distribution process for issuers offering securities for sale.171
Like the term “security”, Section 2(a)(3) of the Securities Act broadly
defines the terms “offer” and “sale”:172 “Any attempt or offer to dispose
of, or solicitation of an offer to buy, a security or interest in a security, for
value”173 constitutes an offer, and a sale is defined as “every disposition
168

Small Business: Exempt Offerings, U.S. SEC & EXCH. COMM’N (last modified Feb. 7,
2020), https://www.sec.gov/smallbusiness/exemptofferings (illustrating the different
exemptions to registration, which include Regulation Crowdfunding, Regulation D, and
Regulation A).
169
See generally Fast Answers: The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry, U.S. SEC &
EXCH. COMM’N (last modified Oct. 1, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/answers/aboutlawsshtml.html.
170
See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(e)(a) (1933) (explaining that Section 5(a) of the Securities Act of
1933 prohibits the offer and sale of securities through interstate commerce and the mails:
“Unless a registration statement is in effect as to a security, it shall be unlawful for any person,
directly or indirectly to make use of any means or instruments of transportation or
communication in interstate commerce or of the mails to sell such security through the use or
medium of any prospectus or otherwise; or to carry or cause to be carried through the mails or
in interstate commerce, by any means or instruments of transportation, any such security for
the purpose of sale or for delivery after sale.”); see also 15 U.S.C. § 77b(e)(c) (explaining
that Section 5(c) of the Securities Act of 1933 prohibits the offer and sale of securities
unless a registration statement is filed: “ It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or
indirectly, to make use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in
interstate commerce or of the mails to offer to sell or offer to buy through the use or medium
of any prospectus or otherwise any security, unless a registration statement has been filed as to
such security, or while the registration statement is the subject of a refusal order or stop order
or (prior to the effective date of the registration statement) any public proceeding or
examination under section 8.”) ; see generally U.S. SEC & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 171.
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Osama Khan, Robert Weber and Robert L. Wernli, Jr., Airdrop of Crypto Tokens Hits
Regulatory
Flak,
NATIONAL
LAW
REVIEW
(Aug.
28,
2018),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/airdrop-crypto-tokens-hits-regulatory-flak.
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See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(3) (1933) (“The term ‘sale’ or ‘sell’ shall include every contract
of sale or disposition of a security or interest in a security, for value. The term ‘offer to
sell’, ‘offer for sale’, or ‘offer’ shall include every attempt or offer to dispose of, or
solicitation of an offer to buy, a security or interest in a security, for value.”).
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Id.; see also Diskin v. Lomasney & Co., 452 F.2d 871, 875 (2d Cir. 1971) (explaining
that the definition has been interpreted as going well beyond the common law concept of
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of a security or interest in a security, for value.”174 Thus, an offer might
be interpreted to include any activity on the part of the issuer which affects
the public by conditioning the market.175 For purposes of Section 5, an
offer and sale can occur even if there is no exchange of monetary
consideration.176 While a bona fide gift would not implicate Section 5, in
situations where the “donor derives some benefit from the purported gift,
the transaction will be treated as a sale.”177

2. Exchange Act of 1934
i. Securities Exchanges
In addition to the requirements of the Securities Act of 1933, the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 mandates registration requirements for a
variety of market participants, including any broker, dealer or exchange.178
Section 5 of the Exchange Act makes it unlawful to operate a securities
exchange without registering with the SEC, unless the exchange operates
under a registration exemption.179 Section 3(a)(1) of the Exchange Act
defines an “exchange” as:
“any organization, association, or group of persons,
whether incorporated or unincorporated, which
constitutes, maintains, or provides a market place or
facilities for bringing together purchasers and sellers of
securities or for otherwise performing with respect to
securities the functions commonly performed by a stock
exchange as that term is generally understood, and
includes the market place and the market facilities
maintained by such exchange.”180

an offer to encompass circumstances that would require the protection of the securities
laws).
174
15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(3) (1933); see also SEC v. Datronics Engineers, Inc., 490 F.2d 250,
253 (4th Cir. 1973) (explaining that the entire transaction must be considered to determine
whether value was received).
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SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, Securities Offering Reform Memorandum, (Aug. 2,
2005),
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See Dror Futter, You Can’t Even Give Them Away …No, Seriously, CROWDFUND INSIDER
(Aug. 16, 2018), https://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2018/08/137933-ico-tokens-the-secyou-cant-even-give-them-away-no-seriously/.
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2 Thomas Lee Hazen, Law of Securities Regulation, § 5.1 (6th ed. 2009).
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To determine whether a trading system meets the definition of
“exchange”, the SEC looks to Exchange Act Rule 3b-16(a), which
provides a functional two-part test: whether the trading system “(1)
[b]rings together the orders for securities of multiple buyers and sellers;
and (2) [u]ses established, non-discretionary methods (whether by
providing a trading facility or by setting rules) under which such orders
interact with each other, and the buyers and sellers entering such orders
agree to the terms of a trade.”181 The SEC will take relevant facts and
circumstances into account when evaluating an entity’s characterization of
its trading system, looking to the activity actually occurring between the
buyers and sellers rather than the technology or terminology used by the
entity to determine whether the system operates as an exchange.182
Moreover, the term “order” is broadly construed and labels assigned to
trading interests are disregarded for the actual activities taking place on
the system.183
This exchange analysis also includes an evaluation of the totality of
activities and technology used to bring orders of buyers and sellers
together on the system.184 If the system displays, or otherwise represents,
trading interests entered on a system to users or centrally receives orders
for processing and execution, then it meets the first prong of the test.185
Additionally, the second prong is easily met if set rules or a trading facility
is provided.186 A system that meets the criteria of the test must register as
a national securities exchange under Section 6 of the Exchange Act, as
proscribed by Section 5.187

ii. Broker-Dealers
Under Section 15(a) of the Exchange Act, absent an exemption, it is
unlawful for any broker or dealer to induce the purchase or sale of any
181

17 CFR § 240.3b-16 (2018).
See Division of Enforcement and Trading and Markets, Statement on Digital Asset
Securities Issuance and Trading, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Nov. 6, 2018),
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See 17 CFR § 240.3b-16 (2018) (explaining Exchange Act Rule 3b-16(b) explicitly
excludes certain systems that the Commission believes are not exchanges, and a system is
not included in the Commission’s interpretation of ‘exchange’ if: (1) the system fails to
meet the two-part test in paragraph (a) of Rule 3(b)-16; (2) the system falls within one of
the exclusions in paragraph (b) of Rule 3b-16; or (3) the Commission otherwise
conditionally or unconditionally exempts the system from the definition); see also 15
U.S.C. § 78f (2018); see also 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2018).
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security, unless the requisite registration requirements are satisfied in
accordance with section 15(b).188 This section requires brokers and dealers
utilizing exchange facilities to effect transactions to register with the SEC
and become members of a self-regulatory organization, like Financial
Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”).189 Section 3(a)(4) defines a
broker as “any person engaged in the business of effecting transactions in
securities for the account of others,”190 while section 3(a)(5) defines a
“dealer” as “any person engaged in the business of buying and selling
securities for such person's own account through a broker or otherwise.”191
These definitions are interpreted broadly and a “person” can include an
entity.192 As with the foregoing “exchange determination,” a functional
approach must be used to assess whether an entity meets the definition of
a broker dealer.193 Thus, SEC-registered broker-dealers are subject to
regulatory and legal requirements that govern their conduct in the
marketplace.194
In sum, these registration requirements provide important safeguards
for main street investors while also promoting market stability by
encouraging an informed investment, so that capital is allocated
efficiently.

D. Regulating ICOs
Based on the federal regulatory framework administered by the SEC,
the first step in regulating ICOs is determining whether an ICO involves
the sale of utility or security tokens. As previously discussed, security
tokens fall within the SEC’s jurisdiction because they resemble traditional
investment vehicles, i.e., securities. Therefore, similar to offering and
selling traditional securities, offerings of security tokens require SEC
registration.195 This is one of the reasons ICOs have come under immense
scrutiny196 as most, if not all, ICOs have not been registered with the
SEC.197
Before the ICO boom in the latter half of 2017, the SEC issued an
investigative report (“DAO Report”) that applied the federal securities
188

See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 180; see also 15 U.S.C. §78o (a-b) (1934).
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laws to the Decentralized Autonomous Organization’s (“DAO”) token
distribution during it’s ICO. 198 The DAO token offering raised around
$150 million, catching the eyes of regulators, even though they did not
pursue any enforcement action.199 Applying the Howey test to the DAO
tokens led the SEC to conclude that the tokens acted as securities, and
therefore the DAO ICO was an unregistered offering of securities.200 The
DAO Report reiterated the fact that the federal securities laws would
require registration of ICOs distributing security tokens and reminded
issuers that a platform meeting the definition of “exchange” would need
to be registered under the Exchange Act.201
Unfortunately, rather than heeding the warning of the SEC, many
issuers mistook the report for an opportunity to test the SEC’s limits.
However, after the DAO Report, the SEC issued a cease and desist order
[to DAO?], signifying its new policy towards unregistered ICOs.202 In In
re Munchee Inc., the SEC found that Munchee Inc.’s ICO was an
unregistered offering of securities and concluded that the company
violated the registration requirements under Section 5 of the Securities
Act.203 Since Munchee, the SEC has sued on a number of cases involving
ICOs, both successfully and unsuccessfully,204 as evidenced in the chart
below:205
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See Report of Investigation, supra note 122.
Id.
200
Id.
201
Id.; see also Tang, supra note 123.
202
In re Munchee Inc., Securities Act Release No. 10445 (Dec. 11, 2017),
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2017/33-10445.pdf.
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See generally Cybersecurity Enforcement Actions, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (last
updated Jan. 7, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/cybersecurity-enforcement-actions.
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Alex Sunnarborg, The Incoming Wave of ICO Regulation (Yes, It’s Coming), COINDESK
(Nov. 3, 2018) https://www.coindesk.com/the-incoming-wave-of-ico-regulation-yes-itscoming.
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Particularly, in November 2018, the SEC announced a settlement with
two companies that were charged with the offer and sale of unregistered
securities.206 The companies both sold digital tokens in ICOs, marking the
first cases where the SEC imposed civil penalties solely for ICO securities
offering violations.207 Co-Director of the SEC’s Enforcement Division,
Stephanie Ativan, warned other issuers that “[t]hese cases tell those who
are considering taking similar actions that [the SEC] continue[s] to be on
the lookout for violations of the federal securities laws with respect to
digital assets.”208 However, the SEC’s approach to regulating ICOs was
brought into question when a federal court denied the agency’s motion for
a preliminary injunction enjoining the ICO of Blockvest, LLC.209

206

Two ICO Issuers Settle SEC Registration Charges, Agree to Register Tokens as
Securities, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, Press Release No. 2018-264 (Nov. 16, 2018),
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-264.
207
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Daniel McAvoy, SEC imposes penalties and provides path to compliance for
unregistered ICOs and digital asset exchanges, NIXON PEABODY (Dec. 14, 2018),
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On the front lines, SEC Chairman Jay Clayton articulated his
disapproval of unregistered ICOs, warning cryptocurrency entrepreneurs
to “get their act together” by registering their ICOs with the SEC to avoid
running into problems down the road.210 Clayton’s remark comes after the
SEC announced its first civil penalties against two crypto companies for
violating the registration requirements.211 Clayton has previously spoken
out about regulating ICOs as securities, stating that “[t]here are none that
I’ve seen that aren’t securities . . . [and] [t]o the extent something is a
security, we should regulate it as a security.”212
Registration is an important mechanism for investors because it
provides them with adequate information regarding important financial
information about a company’s securities. Without a registration statement
on file, investors are left in the dark and might be lured into investing into
fraudulent schemes. For example, a recent study revealed that over 80%
of ICOs are scams.213 Thus, due to the popularity of ICOs, investors need
the protection of the SEC now more than ever.
In an effort to protect people from fraudulent ICOs, social media and
search engine giants have gone as far as banning advertising and sponsored
posts relating to ICOs and cryptocurrencies.214 Facebook first announced
its ban in early 2018, with Google, Snapchat and Twitter following suit
shortly after.215 Yet it is unlikely that ICOs will halt entirely anytime soon,
even though their use has declined due to increased regulatory action and
bans by online advertising giants. Instead, risk-averse developers have
turned to airdrops as an alternative way to create buzz and separate their
projects from the dense token landscape.216

E. Platform Regulation
The SEC seeks to regulate trading platforms as an alternative way to
shield the market from fraudulent and manipulative trading practices and
https://www.nixonpeabody.com/-/media/Files/Alerts/2018-December/SEC-enforcementactions-for-unregistered-ICOs.ashx.
210
Andrew Ramonas, SEC Chair Tells Unregistered ICOs to ‘Get Your Act Together’,
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211
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 207.
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Torsten Hartmann, Are security tokens the new standard? What is the difference between
security
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utility
tokens,
CAPTAINALTCOIN
(Nov.
11,
2018),
https://captainaltcoin.com/security-vsutility-tokens/.
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Shobhit Seth, 80% of ICOs are Scams: Report, INVESTOPEDIA (Apr. 2, 2018),
https://www.investopedia.com/news/80-icos-are-scams-report/.
214
Bonnie Chan, Will airdrop be an alternative to the ICO, GATECOIN (Apr. 2, 2018),
https://blog.gatecoin.com/will-the-airdrop-be-an-alternative-to-the-ico-1b1bdff716c6.
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to protect investors from ICO scams.217 These trading platforms provide a
method to buy and sell digital assets, including tokens offered and sold in
ICOs.218 By targeting platforms and ICOs, the SEC can expand its civil
enforcement powers.
On March 7, 2018, the SEC released a “Statement on Potentially
Unlawful Online Platforms for Trading Digital Assets”, which reiterated
its position that platforms acting as exchanges and trade tokens that meet
the definition of a security “must register as a national securities
exchange or operate under an exemption from registration.”219 Once a
trading platform is labeled as a “securities exchange”, or otherwise
operates as an “alternative trading system”,220 the platform comes the
SEC’s direct, and is thus subject to the federal securities laws.221
On November 8, 2018, the SEC announced that it had settled charges
against Zachary Coburn, the founder of EtherDelta, a digital trading
platform.222 This was the first instance of enforcement based on findings
that the platform operated as an unregistered national securities
exchange.223 To date, no crypto exchanges have been registered with the
SEC, though Coinbase is the first platform to apply for registration.224

F. Broker-Dealer Regulation
By gaining command over digital asset transactions, the SEC extended
its registration requirements to investment companies, broker dealers,
ICOs, and other digital assets.225 Under Section 15 of the Exchange Act,
any entity that facilitates the issuance of digital security tokens in ICOs
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exemption provided under Exchange Act Rule 3a1-1(a). To operate under this exemption,
an ATS must comply with the requirements set forth in Rules 300-303 of Regulation
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and secondary trading in digital security tokens is required to register with
the SEC as a “broker” or “dealer.”226
In In re Tokenlot, LLC, the SEC Commission applied the broker-dealer
registration requirements to an entity trading or facilitating transactions in
digital securities for the first time.227 There, an online “ICO superstore”
offered investors a way to purchase digital tokens during ICOs and engage
in secondary trading.228 It further demonstrated that entities facilitating
ICOs and transactions in secondary markets can meet the broker-dealer
definition even though they do not meet the definition of an exchange.229

IV. ASSESSING AIRDROPS UNDER THE FEDERAL
SECURITIES LAWS
“You can’t just send shares of stock to people. The
problem with an airdrop is that it’s generally incongruent
with US security laws. My general advice for STO
issuers, I would put that airdrop concept on hold. I would
advise anyone in the US not to do it. I get it, it’s a good
marketing tactic, but there’s too much risk and
uncertainty.”230
There are always people looking for shortcuts, and the use of airdrops
is no different. In the United States, federal securities laws aim to regulate
the economy and protect investors by requiring full and fair disclosure
concerning the offer or sale of securities.231 Complying with these
complex statutes can be extremely costly and burdensome for issuers,
which is why digital coin offerings are an increasingly attractive
“alternative” for raising capital and enticing investors.232 Although they
are clever attempts to bypass federal securities laws, certain
cryptocurrencies, ICOs and airdrops may be within their broad scope.233
And following the determination that an instrument is a security,
226

Id.
SEC Charges ICO Superstore and Owners with Operating As Unregistered Broker Dealers, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, Press Release No. 2018-185 (Sept. 11, 2018),
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registration is required unless an exemption is met.234 Additionally, any
entity or person engaging in exchange activities must register as a national
securities exchange or operate under an exemption from registration.235

A. What’s an Airdrop to and Orange Grove? Applying the Howey
Test
In reaction to the SEC’s attacks on ICOs, issuers have attempted to
bypass securities laws through the use of airdrops.236 Determining whether
a transaction involves digital securities is fact intensive and the outcome
may differ from case to case.237 Nonetheless, the Howey test has become
a common legal litmus test for deciding whether or not a digital asset is a
security.
Because airdrops involve distributing “free” digital tokens, how can
the first prong of the Howey test be satisfied if there is no investment of
money? In fact, “the investment of money” doesn’t necessarily mean
money.238 The SEC’s DAO Report established that an investment contract
can be created whether or not the underlying investment consisted of
money or cash. 239 Instead, “the ‘investment’ may take the form of ‘goods
and services,’240 or some other ‘exchange of value.’”241 Thus, where an
issuer provides investors with “free” tokens in exchange for services
designed to advance their company’s interests, the so-called “free” tokens
are no longer free.242
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15 U.S.C. § 77b(e)(c) (2011).
Tang, supra note 123.
236
Stankovic, supra note 127.
237
Id.
238
See Uselton v. Comm. Lovelace Motor Freight, Inc., 940 F.2d 564, 574 (10th Cir. 1991)
(explaining that, in determining whether an investment contract exists, cash is not the only
form of contribution or investment that will create an investment contract).
239
See Report of Investigation, supra note 122 (This report evidenced the investigation of
DAO Tokens. DAO is an example of Decentralized Autonomous Organization, which is a
term used to describe a “virtual” organization embodied in computer code and executed on
a distributed ledger of blockchain. The investigation of DAO tokens raised question
regarding the application of the U.S federal securities laws to the offer and sale of DAO
Tokens, including the threshold question whether DAO Tokens are securities. Based on
the facts presented in this investigation the Commission determined that DAO tokens are
securities under the federal securities laws.).
240
See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 560 (1979) (an investment may
take the form of “goods and services” rather than just “cash”).
241
See Hocking v. Dubois, 885 F.2d 1449, 1471 (9th Cir.1989) (explaining that an
exchange of value satisfies the first prong of the Howey test).
242
See In re Tomahawk Exploration LLC and David Thompson Laurance, Securities Act
Release No. 10530, at 8 (Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2018/3310530.pdf.
235

342

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:311

In the airdrop context, investors trade their services—promoting a
marketplace—for the issuing company’s virtual token.243 However a
separate problem occurs in a situation where the tokens are no longer
defined as conditional gifts because the issuers do not demand anything
from the investors. In that scenario, the question is whether the issuers’
reliance on the airdrop recipients’ self-interest sufficient to satisfy
Howey’s first prong? The answer requires viewing a case in its entirety.
At this point, the SEC’s is that the Howey’s first prong is satisfied when
airdrop recipients provide marketing or promotional services to the
issuer.244
Airdrops can fulfill the “common enterprise” element of Howey’s
second prong under the horizontal commonality approach. Developers
pool the recipient’s “investments” together to build the network, i.e., by
utilizing the investors’ marketing services to promote the underlying
project. However, the argument against this approach is that the
“investments” do not lead to capital raising to be used to develop the
issuer’s project.
Out of the four prongs, the third prong bears the most weight.245 While
airdrop recipients do not “purchase” the coins per se, they are incentivized
to engage in the transactions and promote the tokens to the rest of the
market in light of the chance to earn a return.246 Thus, by virtue of their
involvement, the investors are looking to gain some economic benefit from
these “free” tokens.247 To investors, the tokens are like a golden ticket that
may enable them to earn a few dollars.248 As long as the “opportunity
provided to offerees tend[s] to induce [investors] by emphasizing the
possibility of profits”249 the third Howey prong is met. Thus, the test does
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not require that profits actually be attained but may be sufficed merely by
the opportunity provided to make a profit.
Lastly, an airdrop must fulfill the fourth prong of the Howey test,
which looks to whether the profits are derived “solely from the efforts of
others.”250 Although airdrop investors contribute their services by
promoting the digital tokens, they ultimately rely on the issuers for the
success of the underlying tokens. The viability of the business model at
the outset of the “free” token distribution is unknown, with each recipient
having no choice but to rely on the promoter to further build the network
and make the enterprise fruitful.251 To further illustrate, when a recipient
of an airdropped token merely waits for the token’s value to appreciate and
does little to market the token themselves, their profits are “from the
efforts of others.” Furthermore, even if the profits from digital tokens are
attributed to price speculation, developers significantly influence a token’s
price on secondary markets through their own actions. Teams of
developers might release updates online or might tout investors with
advertising or through social media.
The endorsers of airdrops might feel differently, finding that airdrop
recipients do not rely on the efforts of others since they are providing
marketing services. Accordingly, if the relevant token network is
sufficiently decentralized, this outcome could change because investors
may no longer reasonably expect another person or group to carry out the
managerial efforts. In effect, the tokens distributed would not represent an
investment contract.252

B. Registration Requirements under the Securities Act: “For
Value”
After assessing whether the subject tokens are securities, the next step
would be to determine whether an airdrop qualifies as an “offer and sale,”
which requires registration under section 5 of the Securities Act.253 As
previously mentioned, an offer is defined as “any attempt to offer or to
dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy a security or interest in a
security, for value,” while a sale is defined as “every disposition of a
security or interest in a security, for value.”254 Even where there is a lack

a participation in earnings resulting from the use of investors' funds. . . In such cases the
investor is "attracted solely by the prospects of a return" on his investment.”).
250
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of monetary consideration exchanged for the securities, there can be an
offer or sale.255
Airdrops clearly meet the criteria for an offer but determining whether
these “free” distributions qualify as sales requires more attention. In the
case of airdrops, developers attempt to bypass registration requirements
by “gifting” tokens. However, this tactic is flawed because only bona fide
gifts do not implicate the registration requirements.256 Thus, a gifted
security is deemed a sale when the donor receives some real benefit,
though this benefit does not need to be monetary.257 Upon “gifting” tokens,
an issuer (donor) of an airdrop receives benefits in the form of online
marketing and promotional activities by the donee.
Airdrops are not the first occurrence of “gifting” securities. In the
landmark case, SEC v. Datronics Engineers, the Fourth Circuit focused on
whether the donor received value from the gifting of “spin-off” stock.258
Datronics contended that there was no statutory sale because the transfers
of stock were not “for value.”259 Contrary to this, the court found that value
accrued to Datronics because “a market for the stock was created by its
transfer to so many new assignees,” and “the stock retained by Datronics
was thereby given an added increment of value.”260 After dissemination,
the value of the stock appreciated substantially, benefiting Datronics.261
Thus, the court held that where a “‘gift’ disperses corporate ownership and
thereby helps to create a public trading market it is treated as a sale.”262
Similarly, in SEC v. Sierra Brokerage Services, Inc., the Southern District
Court in Ohio held that the “gifted” shares of stock constituted sales of
securities since they were intended to create a market.263 In effect,
permitting these “gifts” would allow companies to evade registration
requirements and “go public by the backdoor.”264
255

See In re Tomahawk Exploration LLC and David Thompson Laurance, Securities Act
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See Shaw v. Dreyfus, 172 F.2d 140, 142 (2d Cir. 1949) (transfers were not sales under
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See SEC v. Sierra Brokerage Servs., Inc., 608 F. Supp. 2d 923, 940–43 (S.D. Ohio
2009), aff’d, 712 F.3d 321 (6th Cir. 2013).
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SEC v. Datronics Engineers, Inc., 490 F.2d 250, 253 (4th Cir. 1973).
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See SEC v. Sierra Brokerage Servs., Inc., 608 F. Supp. 2d 923, 940–43 (S.D. Ohio
2009), aff’d, 712 F.3d 321 (6th Cir. 2013).
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Glossary of Stock Market Terms: Going Public Through the Backdoor, NASDAQ,
https://www.nasdaq.com/investing/glossary/g/going-public-through-the-backdoor
(last
visited Mar. 2, 2019) (Defining “going public through the backdoor” as “[t]he process by
which a company comes to have publicly traded shares without an IPO. This could happen
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Airdropping tokens presents obvious similarities to the gifting of stock
shares that took place in these cases. In reality, an issuer is not distributing
these tokens for a charitable purpose.265 Issuers primarily use airdrops to
market and distribute their tokens.266 The underlying purpose of these
“gifts” is to create a public market for the digital project, which provides
value to the issuer.267 By “gifting” the tokens, the developers hope to create
a community of users and a public marketplace.268
Airdrop issuers also receive value through online marketing, including
the promotion of the project on online forums and blogs.269 Additionally,
an airdrop may generate some form of economic benefit or value for the
issuer by generating promotional benefits related to the blockchain
platform or even by producing more interest in a related token sale.270
Airdrop issuers are actually “gifting” tokens to recipients in exchange for
promotional services to advance their own economic objectives and
generate interest for their projects.271 As a result, issuers rely on these
“gifts” as a mechanism to disseminate their tokens among users and
ultimately create a marketplace.272 Essentially, issuers are looking to
circumvent the registration requirements and the scrutiny that surrounds
conducting an ICO by creating a public market for their tokens through a
back-door offering. Despite this clever ruse to evade registration
requirements these “gifts” unavoidably qualify as sales because they create
value for issuers.273
The SEC chose to attack the gift problem under Rule 15c2-11, which
requires that a broker-dealer have information equivalent to that in a
registration statement before effecting a transaction.274 This contemporary
through a reverse shell merger, or through acquisition of a public company and offering
shares to previous owners. Another way is through a series of private placements, selling
shares on an exchange to institutional and other sophisticated investors.”).
265
Bitcoin Exchange Guide News Team, Cryptocurrency Airdrops Controversy:
Philanthropy or Effective Marketing Strategy?, BITCOIN EXCHANGE GUIDE (Nov. 13,
2018),
https://bitcoinexchangeguide.com/cryptocurrency-airdrops-controversyphilanthropy-or- effective-marketing-strategy/.
266
Gina Conheady & Christian Munoz, Airdrops: Are free tokens free from regulation?,
BLOOMBERG LAW (June 1, 2018), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/banking-law/airdropsare-free-tokens-free-from-regulation.
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SEC v. Sierra Brokerage Servs., Inc., 608 F. Supp.2d 923, 940-943 (S.D. Ohio 2009)
(“[W]here a gift is followed by widespread downstream sales of those securities, these
would-be gifts may be characterized as a subterfuge to evade registration.”).
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17 CFR § 240.15c2-11 (2015).
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means of dealing with the “gifted” securities issue and companies going
public through the back door is intended to ensure that a market-maker has
adequate information and has completed adequate due diligence before it
quotes securities.275
In effect, the SEC has principally used its 1934 Exchange Act powers
to prevent broker-dealers from making a market for securities for which
there is no adequate information provided.276 To some degree, the SEC has
attempted to indirectly engage the airdrop problem by regulating trading
platforms and broker-dealers. By requiring registration of exchanges and
broker-dealers, the SEC has tightened its grip on the situation.
As the evolution of capital formation continues, regulators are guiding
companies to conduct compliant digital-asset distributions by using
exemptions available under the existing regulatory framework.277

C. History Repeats Itself: “Free Stock” Offerings vs. Airdrops
“Free stock is really a misnomer[.] While cash did not
change hands, the companies that issued the stock
received valuable benefits.”278
Reminiscent of the “Dot.com” bubble burst that occurred roughly two
decades ago, airdrops share blatant similarities with what was once termed
“free stock.”279 Internet companies that distributed this so called “free
stock” were eventually targeted and eradicated by the SEC’s enforcement
actions.280 As a method of swindling investors into participating in newly
launched internet ventures, companies offered stock to people who
provided personal information or agreed to solicit other investors by word
of mouth.281 In these cases, the SEC was forced to consider whether the
distribution of free shares of stock triggered the registration requirements
275
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Application,
http://www.legalandcompliance.com/securities-law/15c2-11-application/ (last visited
Mar. 3, 2019).
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278
SEC Brings First Actions to Halt Unregistered Online Offerings of So-Called “Free
Stock”, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (99-83) (last modified Jul. 22, 1999),
https://www.sec.gov/news/headlines/webstock.htm.
279
See Scott H Kimpel, and Mayme Beth F. Donohue, SEC Brings Enforcement Case
Involving “Airdrop” of Securities, HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH LLP (Aug. 21, 2018),
https://www.blockchainlegalresource.com/2018/08/sec-brings-enforcement-caseinvolving-airdrop-securities/#page=1.
280
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 280.
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Edward Wyatt, S.E.C. Settles 4 Cases Offering ‘Free Stock’, N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 1999),
https://www.nytimes.com/1999/07/23/business/sec-settles-4-cases-offering-freestock.html.
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of the Securities Act.282 The SEC's analysis focused on whether an offer
or sale of securities for value took place.283 This empowered the SEC to
take the position that the issuers were not giving the stocks away for free
because they were receiving value from the recipients, who acted as
marketing liaisons by referring the companies to others or engaging in
some sort of activity to draw the attention of other individuals.284
Accordingly, there was an offer and sale for value for the purposes of the
Securities Act.285 Once more, history repeats itself; though this time it is
airdrop issuers conditioning the market with “free” distributions, thus
triggering application of the securities laws.

1. Four Seminal Free Stock Cases
In four seminal cases the SEC’s enforcement division brought, and
settled against, distributors of free stock. The common theme was
unmistakably clear: “free” did not mean free from regulatory
compliance.286 In each of these cases, prospective recipients were required
to perform some action—whether that meant signing up on the issuer’s
website, providing personal information, or email addresses—to receive
free shares. Additional free shares may also have been offered in exchange
for referrals. Consequently, issuers received economic benefit from these
“free stock” offerings. Therefore, there was an offer and sale of securities.
First, in In re Joe Loofbourrow, the SEC found that Loofbourrow had
violated the registration provisions of the Securities Act when he
represented that his company, American Space Corp., would give ten
shares of “free” stock to individuals who filled out an online registration
form.287 The online registration form required individuals to provide their
names, home addresses, and email addresses, and additionally included a
series of questions aimed at ensuring that registrants had read through
portions of the website that discussed “financial partner offers.”288
Loofbourrow also offered additional “free” shares to individuals who
referred others to his website.289 Based on these actions, the SEC held that
the primary purpose of the offering was to generate interest and encourage
282
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individuals to invest capital in the company, which constituted an offer or
sale of securities for value.290
Second, in In re Web Works Marketing.Com, Inc. and Trace D.
Cornell, the SEC found dissemination of “free” stock in violation of the
registration requirements.291 Under Web Works’s scheme, an individual
would: (1) receive three free shares if they registered with Web Works; (2)
receive up to ten additional free shares for referrals; (3) receive twentyfour shares by subscribing to long distance phone services offered by
Telco; (4) receive 25 extra shares if they remained a Telco customer for
six months.292 Like in Loofbourrow, Web Works sought to attract visitors
to its website and generate interest through it’s “free stock offering.”293
Web Works’s website even went so far as to explain that "high site traffic
was essential to a successful website . . . When you tell others about the
site, you create value for the company. That is exactly why we are offering
the shares as a gift."294 The SEC held that Web Works’s scheme
constituted an unregistered free stock offering.
Third, the SEC a made similar finding that unregistered free stock was
offered online in In re WowAuction.com Inc. and Steven M. Gaddis, Sr.,
where WowAuction offered three shares of “free” stock to individuals who
registered with the company.295 WowAuction also offered up to seven
additional free shares for referrals.296 Additionally, five registered users
were eligible to be selected to receive 10,00 free shares in a drawing.297
Gaddis and WowAuction disseminated the “free” stock to generate
interest in WowAuction and attract visitors to the website.298 The SEC held
290

Id. (“The primary purpose of the ‘free’ stock offering was to generate publicity for ASC
and encourage members of the public to become ‘financial partners" by investing capital
in ASC.”).
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that WOWAuction’s scheme qualified as a free stock offering and thus
violated the registration requirements of Section 5 of the Securities Act.
Fourth, In re Theodore Sotirakis, also involved an offering of
unregistered “free” stock.299 Here, individuals who registered on the
website Sotirakis created for his Kinesis business (“the Kinesis site”) and
linked a website to the Kinesis site received “free” shares.300 Additionally,
individuals could also earn extra shares by signaling additional registrants
to the Kinesis site, like the referral incentive in In re WowAuction.com Inc.
and Steven M. Gaddis, Sr.301 Once more, the SEC held that free shares
were distributed to generate site traffic and attract investors, thus
demonstrating that the shares were disposed of for value.302

2. “Free” Token Offerings
The bottom line is that the SEC is not fond of any attempt to offer
“free” unregistered securities.303 “Free stocks” require recipients to bring
in additional investors, sign up on the issuers’ websites or link their own
websites to those of the distributor, hence providing exposure and
circulation of the stock.304 By creating an interest in their respective
websites, and a market for their shares, the “free stock” issuers receive
economic value. Therefore, under the Securities Act, there is an offer or
sale for value.305
The SEC’s analysis of the foregoing cases is directly relevant to
airdrops.306 Airdrops undoubtedly mirror free stock offerings, which,
while ostensibly “free,” are not intended as “gift[s] for simple reasons of
generosity.”307 In view of the “free stock” precedent, an airdrop of tokens
299
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without monetary consideration may qualify as an offer or sale when the
purpose of the airdrop is to advance the network’s economic objectives.308
This might include establishing a trading market for the tokens, rather than
making a gift out of generosity.309 In light of the foregoing, airdrops are a
prime example of history repeating itself.310

D. Taking down TOM: The SEC’s Unsurprising Crackdown
It was only a matter of time before the SEC caught up to speed and
came down on developers using airdrops in place of ICOs. On August 14,
2018, the SEC issued a cease and desist order against Tomahawk
Exploration LLC (“Tomahawk”) and David Thompson Laurence for
violating the registration and antifraud provisions of the federal securities
acts.311 Following unsuccessful attempts at trying to find private funding,
Tomahawk and Laurence needed another way to support their oil drilling
and gas exploration project, which they envisioned taking place in Kern
County, California.312
In the summer of 2017, the Tomahawk ICO website was launched
, stating the ICO would be open from July through August.313 Through its
ICO, 200 million Tomahawkcoins (“TOM”) would be issued with the
hope of raising roughly five million dollars to fund the cost of drilling the
oil wells.314 Only half of these 200 million coins would be up for purchase
for potential investors who were willing to gamble the low amount: $0.05
per token.315 Rather than just offer tokens for purchase, Tomahawk

is to advance the donor's economic objectives rather than to make a gift for simple reasons
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308
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introduced a “Bounty Program”316 as a way to further promote the ICO.317
According to the SEC’s order:
“Tomahawk dedicated 200,000 TOM to pay to third
parties in exchange for the third parties’ marketing efforts.
Tomahawk featured the Bounty Program prominently on
the ICO Website, offering between 10 and 4,000 TOM for
activities such as making requests to list TOM on token
trading platforms, promoting TOM on blogs and other
online forums like Twitter or Facebook, and creating
professional picture file designs, YouTube videos or other
promotional materials.”318
Ultimately, more than 80,000 TOM tokens were airdropped to
approximately forty wallet holders with Tomahawk, receiving “value in
the form of online promotional efforts that targeted potential investors and
directed them to Tomahawk’s offering.”319 Unfortunately for Tomahawk,
the profitless ICO and airdropping came with a hefty price tag, including
fines and a professional sanction against Laurence.320
To get to its holding, the SEC applied the Howey test.321 Under the
Howey test, the SEC found that the TOM tokens were investment
contracts, and therefore securities.322 Then, under the second part of its
316
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analysis, the SEC considered whether the distribution of tokens constituted
an “offer and sale of securities.”323 The SEC held that “[t]he distribution of
TOM . . . constituted sales under Section 2(a)(3) of the Securities Act,
which applies to ‘every disposition of a security or interest in a security,
for value.’”324 Notably, the lack of monetary consideration for “free”
shares did not suggest that there was no sale or offer for purposes of
Section 5 of the Securities Act.325 Therefore, Tomahawk offered and sold
TOM tokens without complying with registration requirements or
qualifying for an exemption from registration, thus violating the federal
Securities laws.326
Since Tomahawk and Laurence’s actions were similar to other recent
SEC orders relating to digital assets,327 it is not shocking that the SEC
found the TOM tokens to be securities.328 However, the Tomahawk Order
is noteworthy because it is the first order to address the airdrop
phenomena.329 It demonstrates the SEC’s view of “free” crypto
distributions, and also serves as a warning to developers attempting to
dodge complying with the federal securities laws via airdrops.330

for the investment of money or other contributions of value, including other digital assets.
The representations in the online offering materials created an expectation of profits
derived from the efforts of others, namely from the oil exploration and production
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V. WHAT DOES THIS MEAN FOR AIRDROPS?
Regulators’ heightened scrutiny of ICOs has undoubtedly paved the
way for the emergence of airdrops. Airdrops have become a tool for
innovative developers to disguise their securities offerings as “free” token
giveaways. Yet these distributions have caught the SEC’s eye, which
continues to maintain a firm stance on its regulation of digital asset
transactions. The notion of regulation through enforcement stands true as
the SEC continues to use its enforcement authority to make examples of
those who fail to comply with the laws, and deter those who might
otherwise participate in such schemes.331 In Re Tomahawk marks the first
instance of enforcement over airdrops, demonstrating that even “free”
tokens are not free from regulatory compliance.332
The SEC has attempted to clarify its position with regard to digital
asset transactions through an investigative report, public statements, and a
slew of lawsuits against emerging tech companies. It is through these
actions that the SEC has provided its application of the Howey test to
digital assets. Even without specific reference to airdrops in any of those
action, it can be concluded that the SEC’s broad jurisdiction encompasses
airdrop distributions, as evidenced by In re Tomahawk.
Historically, the SEC’s stop to “free” stock involved preventing
broker-dealers from making a market in securities for which there is no
adequate issuer-provided information. To some degree, the SEC has
followed that strategy with respect to airdrops and cryptocurrencies, by
regulating trading platforms instead of specifically regulating the token
offerings. By regulating intermediaries, the SEC seeks to ensure that there
is no way to circumvent the federal securities laws.
However, applying this tactic to airdrops and digital assets is trickier
since their peer-to-peer transactions eliminates the intermediary issue.
Nonetheless, regulators are encroaching on whatever gray area remains;
they are quickly closing in on digital asset transactions altogether. We can
expect to see the SEC continue to expand its oversight of digital assets
with the goal of creating a marketplace inhabited only by compliant digital
transactions. But it is also clear that developers will continue to come up
with new methods for evading securities laws as regulators become

331
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stricter. Eliminating one way of distributing virtual securities opens the
door to another way.
Are regulators approaching the situation all wrong? Regulators
continue to walk the tightrope of trying to balance protecting investors,
avoiding system failures, and fostering innovation. As the crypto market
continues to develop, regulators must ensure that protection is afforded to
investors without unduly limiting opportunities for growth. In a sense,
overly restrictive interpretations of the securities laws might inhibit the
economy’s growth—punishing not only the bad actors, but the good ones
as well.
Even though many skeptics are against digital asset
transactions,333 the underlying technology may prove invaluable for future
technological innovations. While regulators are required to maintain the
integrity of the market by weeding out bad actors, they also need to
balance this interest with the effect of chilling good innovation brought
about by new technology and good actors.334 If regulators continue on the
path of heavy-handed regulation, then capital from these digital
transactions might stop flowing into the U.S., pushing U.S. investors to
send their money to foreign companies where securities laws are less harsh
and more certain.335 Market participants may also fear the uncertainty
surrounding token offerings in the U.S., thus driving token sales overseas.
SEC enforcement actions have provided some guidance with respect to
when digital assets are considered securities but have not fully addressed
the market’s need for comprehensive clarity.
To achieve further regulatory clarity, Congress should pass legislation
that establishes a comprehensive legislative and regulatory system
governing domestic digital assets. Currently, two federal agencies share
jurisdiction over cryptocurrency regulation: the SEC has jurisdiction over
“security tokens” and the CFTC has jurisdiction over “commodity
tokens.” Congress should also vest one agency with regulatory jurisdiction
over all types of cryptocurrency, especially since determining which
tokens are commodities and which are securities can be difficult.336
333
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Otherwise, regulators need to co-coordinate to provide clear guidance to
the market.
Furthermore, Congress should authorize the SEC to modify and
amend its rules to better assist digital asset issuers in meeting the
requirements of the federal securities laws. The current infrastructure, and
the federal securities laws, are inadequate to appropriately address digital
asset transactions.337 While there are already a number of disclosure and
registration requirements in place, they do not work well with digital asset
offerings.338 Regulations that needlessly impede on the innovation and
capital formation opportunities offered by the development of digital
technologies should be supplemented or modified so that compliance is
possible.339
One example of supplementing the existing legal framework is for the
SEC to promulgate an exemption from the registration requirements
modeled after Regulation A340 (or as amended by the JOBS Act:
Regulation A+) or Regulation D under the Securities Act.341 Currently,
Regulation A is an exemption from registration for public offerings of up
to $50 million, providing two tiers of exempt offerings.342 This exemption
also permits resales and does not require that investors be accredited.343
337

Id. (“[T]he existing rules that apply to the sales of securities and the exemptions from
registration with the SEC, such as Rule 506 of Regulation D, and Regulation A, though
helpful, do not fully meet the needs of companies seeking to issue digital assets.”).
338
Id. (“ICOs present a novel form of capital raising, in which the token investor's primary
concerns are the likely future commercial viability of the related token platform, and
(usually) the ability of the Token Company to develop, maintain and operate the token
platform and the token economy. This is very different from the situation in traditional
capital raising techniques, such as the sale of stock and bonds, in which investors are
primarily concerned with the future economic activities and well-being of the company
that issued the stock or bonds. Not surprisingly, a securities- regulatory scheme developed
for stocks and bonds does not fit perfectly for tokens and token platforms.”).
339 Id.
(“[R]egulations either need to be created or modified to better suit this type of
business model, as registering digital assets as securities is impracticable for these
companies.”).
340
17 CFR § 230.251 (2019).
341
17 CFR § 230.500 (2013).
342
Raising Capital Using a Regulation A+ Mini IPO, SEEDINVEST (Oct. 28, 2016),
https://www.seedinvest.com/blog/jobs-act/raising-capital-reg-a-mini-ipo (explaining that
Tier 1 offerings are up to $20 million and Tier 2 offerings are up to $50 million, with
investors of Tier 2 subject to investment limits of the greater of 10% of their net worth or
10% of their net income).
343
Id.; see also James Chen, Accredited Investor, INVESTOPEDIA (last updated Feb. 23,
2019), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/accreditedinvestor.asp (last visited Mar. 2,
2019) (“An accredited investor is a person or a business entity who is allowed to deal in
securities that may not be registered with financial authorities. They are entitled to such
privileged access if they satisfy one (or more) requirements regarding income, net worth,
asset size, governance status or professional experience. In the U.S., the term is used by
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) under Regulation D to refer to investors
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Regulation D also has two “tiers”, Rule 506(b), and Rule 506(c), with
no cap on the amount of the offering.344 Rule 506(b) allows for an
unlimited number of accredited investors, and thirty-five non-accredited
investors, but does not allow for general solicitation or advertising.345 On
the other hand, Rule 506(c) requires that all investors be accredited and
their status verified by the issuer, but allows for general solicitation.346
A hybrid of Regulations A and D might offer an exemption suitable
for digital token issuers. This exemption may retain some features of both
Regulations A and D, or modify them. For example, the proposed
exemption could have no resale restrictions, an offering cap of $100
million, only allow for accredited investors, and permit general
solicitation. Furthermore, the disclosure requirements would need to be
particular to token offerings and might require the white paper to include
the prospectus (or vice versa). Moreover, the prospectus would need to be
available on the online platform. Information about the platform’s
supporting network might also need to be included as per the disclosure
requirements. And airdrops could be allowed so long as they are outlined
within the prospectus.
For token exchanges, Congress or the SEC could propose a safe harbor
rule allowing for the trade of security tokens if the issuer has either
registered with the SEC or qualifies for an exemption from registration.
While the federal securities laws have served our capital markets well
since their adoption in the 1930s, it is time for Congress and the SEC to
address technological innovations and amend the outdated rules. Without
clearer guidelines regarding the regulation of digital securities, the growth
of the nation’s capital markets will be hindered.

CONCLUSION
In the twenty-first century, cryptocurrency has emerged as a new
wonder of the world. Building off blockchain technology, new digital
platforms have consumed the virtual marketplace, disrupting it and
fashioning innovative branding strategies. For issuers seeking a way
around compliance and the scrutiny following ICOs, airdrops seem like
the next best option. But based on past enforcement actions halting “free
stock” offerings and gifted securities, the current regulatory regime
who are financially sophisticated and have a reduced need for the protection provided by
regulatory disclosure filings. Accredited investors include natural high net worth
individuals (HNWI), banks, insurance companies, brokers and trusts.”).
344
See generally Fast Answers: Rule 506 of Regulation D, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (last
modified Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answers-rule506htm.html.
345
Id.
346
Id.
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surrounding ICOs and the SEC’s framework for analyzing digital asset
transactions, airdrops cannot avoid the SECs broadly casted jurisdiction.
Ultimately, these “free” tokens are not free from regulatory compliance.

